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I. Introduction
The creation of a motion picture follows a definite life cycle. It is
born when a screenwriter comes up with an idea and puts it into
words. The writer creates unique characters, setting, plot, and a
central theme, expanding on his original idea. He then takes the
unique idea to a producer, hoping that he or she will want to make
the screenplay into a movie. The producer has various options. First,
he may refuse to hear the idea at all. He may not know whether or
not the screenwriter is capable of good writing. The producer may
fear that, if he hears the idea, he may later be subject to a lawsuit for
* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, 2006. The
author would like to thank Professor Margreth Barrett for her valuable insight that
contributed to the strength of this note.
creating a similar film. Second, the producer may hear the idea and
desire to make it into a film, which is pleasing to all. This scenario is
rare, however, because the producer likely hears hundreds of ideas
and goes forward with a very small percentage of them. Further,
hundreds more are never heard at all. Third, the producer may hear
or acquire the screenplay, but decide not to make a movie out of it.
This final possibility is the subject of this note.
When a writer has given his idea away to the filmmaker, he
should be fairly compensated in the event of its use. Because of his
hard work and effort, he should be protected from the producer
taking credit for what he has come up with. "Idea protection" refers
to "legal rights.. . when a person discloses her idea to someone in a
position to implement it, and the disclosee proceeds to use it without
the discloser's permission and without paying her for it."1
Compensation is warranted in such a situation, but must have
reasonable limits. Many have argued that writers like this one do not
get adequate protection for ideas in circumstances like that just
described.2 This note will argue a point that is often forgotten in the
zealous desire to afford idea protection. A writer should be
compensated for use of his idea, but only if the producer actually uses
the idea. There must be an element of similarity that goes beyond the
mere subject matter of the screenplay or film in order to recover
compensation for use. The current state of the law in California is too
vague and inconsistent, and affords the writers' interest too much
consideration as a result. In doing so, the interests of the producers
are overlooked, at the ultimate expense of the public.
In California, idea protection is both overly generous and
ambiguous. In 2004, the case of Grosso v. Miramax3 allowed a claim
to go forward in federal court based on California state law for the
protection of ideas. The idea was a written screenplay by Jeff Grosso,
who later sued Miramax for alleged use of his idea.4 The Ninth
Circuit, noting the lack of similarity between the two works, still
allowed the claim to go forward The decision seems to defy logic.
1. MARGRETH BARRETr, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 372 (West Group ed.,
American Casebook Series 2001)(1995).
2. See, e.g., Celine Michaud & Gregory Tulquois, Idea Men Should Be Able To
Enforce Their Contractual Rights, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 75 (2003); Glen L. Kulik,
Copyright Preemption: Is This the End of Desny v. Wilder?, 21 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1
(2000).
3. 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Other cases have been inconsistent, leaving courts with no workable
standard on whether to allow these claims to go to a jury.6
This note will address the current state of idea law. It appears
that concern over protecting the writers is going too far, harming the
interests of the producers. Writers are getting to court when their
ideas are different from those in the producers' films. The producers
create the films for the public audience. The end of the film's life
cycle occurs when it is shown in a theater to a live audience. If the
producer can provide the public with two hours of entertainment, he
has succeeded in making a good film. The United States, and
California in particular, are leaders in filmmaking. It is doubtful that
one could think of Southern California without picturing Hollywood
and its remarkable entertainment industry. This is the case because
filmmakers have the best talent in writing at their disposal. Both the
producer and the screenwriter are essential parts of the cycle, and the
law should not forget the interest of either one. Otherwise, the public
suffers in the end.
This note will begin by discussing the history of copyright law
and idea protection law and how the two interact and differ. It will
then explain current developments and inconsistencies in these areas
of law and argue that the writer's interests are being given too much
attention while the producer's are being overlooked, bearing in mind
that the public will be harmed when the producer cannot produce his
best work. It will then propose that courts require a showing of some
common element beyond the mere topic involved in the two works
before the plaintiff can get to trial on the issue of similarity. This
solution to the problem takes the interests of both parties into
account, and will preserve the excellence of Hollywood for the
enjoyment of the public.
II. History and Background
A. Federal Copyright Law
Before considering state law theories for protecting ideas, it is
necessary to understand the basics of copyright law, and how writers
protect their work. There is some similarity and overlap between
these laws and the state laws protecting ideas. The purpose of federal
copyright protection is to "foster growth of learning and culture for
6. See, e.g., Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1950); Landsberg v.
Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986); Weitzenkorn v.
Lesser, 256 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1953).
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the public welfare, and the grant of exclusive rights to authors for a
limited time is a means to that end."7 Put another way, the purpose is
"to stimulate the creation and dissemination of intellectual works,
thus advancing 'the progress of science and useful arts."'8 The
purpose of copyright law is relevant because it is related to the
purposes of idea protection under state law theories.
Prior to 1976, federal law only protected those works which were
actually published.9 Unpublished works, like a screenplay that has
been written but not yet accepted or acquired by a producer, could
only hope to get protection through state statutory or common law
theories.' ° In 1976, Congress amended the statute to expand the scope
of federal protection." Federal law now protects unpublished works
as well as published ones, a development which undoubtedly adds
protection to the writers, who previously had no federal claim until
the point at which their works were actually published. 2
In copyright infringement cases, a plaintiff must show substantial
similarity between his work and the subsequent work. In Arnstein v.
Porter, the Second Circuit set forth a test for evaluating infringement
claims." First, the plaintiff must show "that defendant copied from
plaintiff's ... work" and second, he must show "that the copying went
so far as to constitute improper appropriation. ',1 4 The second prong of
this test was recently considered by the Third Circuit in Kay Berry,
Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc. 5 Regarding improper appropriation, the
court stated that
[w]hen determining whether two works are substantially similar, a
fact-finder must determine whether the later work is similar
because it appropriates the unique expressions of the original
author, or merely because it contains elements that would be
expected when two works express the same idea or explore the
same theme.1
6
Thus, copyright infringement requires that a writer's "unique
expression" be appropriated. Situations may arise where a producer
uses a screenwriter's idea without rising to this level. In those
7. Barrett, supra note 1, at 396.
8. Id. at 398.
9. Lionel S. Sobel, The Law of Ideas, Revisited, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 9, 20 (1994).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
14. Id. at 468.
15. 421 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005).
16. Id. at 208.
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instances, states have come up with various legal theories to protect
the writer. Once the Copyright Act of 1976 amended the statute to
cover unpublished works as well as published ones, some courts held
such state law claims were preempted. 7
The Copyright Act preempts "all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright ... .,,i This notion stems from the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. 19 In the past, the Ninth Circuit has set forth the
test for preemption.' First, the work "must come within the subject
matter of copyright as defined in Sections 102 and 103 of the
Copyright Act., 21 Second, "the rights granted under state law must be
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by Section 106 of the Copyright Act." Section
102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976 states that in "no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea.., regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work. 23 The Sixth Circuit in Wrench
LLC v. Taco Bell Corp. 2' held that state idea protection laws come
within the subject matter of federal copyright protection. These
doctrines therefore satisfy the first prong of the test for preemption.
However, the court went on to explain that if the state law claim
requires "an extra element ... instead of or in addition to the acts of
reproduction, performance, distribution or display ... there is no
preemption, provided that the extra element changes the nature of
the action so that it is qualitatively different from a copyright
infringement claim., 25 Thus, for state idea protection claims to avoid
preemption by the Federal Copyright Act, they must require an extra
element. The focus of this note is the protection of ideas through
contract theories in California. Such claims arguably are not
preempted by Federal law because they require the extra element of
an promise to pay between the writer and the producer. 6 This
element changes the nature of the action from protection of literary
17. See, e.g., Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
18. 17 U.S.C. §301(a) (1976).
19. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
20. Del Madera Prop. v. Rhodes and Gardner, Inc. 820 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1987)
21. Id. at 976.
22. Id.
23. 17 U.S.C. §102(b) (1976).
24. 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001).
25. Id. at 456.
26. Id.
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expression, the purpose of Federal Copyright Law, to protection of
the right of freedom of contract.27 The nature of the state law claim is
to recognize a contract formed between the parties, not to give
independent protection to the underlying idea itself.
B. State Law Theories
California and New York have received the most attention for
their idea protection doctrines, most likely because of their status at
the forefront of the entertainment industry. 8 The majority of
television shows and films are made in those states, and production
studios have their offices, studio lots, and headquarters there.29 These
and other state courts have used various legal theories in an attempt
to provide protection for writers who submit ideas to filmmakers. For
example, some courts and commentators have argued that state
property rights should be recognized in an author's idea before it is
published, and property law should allow the author to bring suit for
unauthorized use of his or her property.' That sort of theory "appears
to recognize property rights in an idea that is novel and
concrete. ....", Also, some courts have relied on the theory that a
screenwriter has a right to payment based on "a confidential
relationship in which the plaintiff reposed trust and confidence in the
defendant's good faith."32 Based on this confidential relationship, the
writer may be able to bring a suit to recover payment for use of his
idea.33
Many states have also implicated contract law principles to
afford protection to the ideas of screenwriters. One such theory is
known as "quasi-contract" (or unjust enrichment), which permits
recovery when denial of payment will result in an injustice. 4 Also, in
some states a plaintiff can bring a claim for recovery based on a
theory of express or implied-in-fact contract. California is such a
27. Id.
28. State law theories of idea protection in both California and New York have been
discussed and critiqued by legal scholars. See, e.g., Camilla M. Jackson, "I've Got This
Great Idea for a Movie!" A Comparison of the Laws in California and New York that
Protect Idea Submissions, 21 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 47 (1996).
29. For example, The Walt Disney Company's studio lot, Warner Brothers, and NBC
Studios are all located in Burbank, California.
30. Barrett, supra note 1, at 374.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 373.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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state.3" According to this doctrine, a plaintiff can recover if he or she
can prove "that the defendant made an explicit promise to pay for the
idea, or can demonstrate an implied agreement to pay under the
particular facts of the case. 36 Under a theory of implied-in-fact
contract, a plaintiff can recover in a claim for use of the idea if he or
she had submitted it to the producer with a clear understanding that
he or she would be reasonably compensated if the idea is
subsequently used by the producer.37 Recall that state law claims must
require an extra element in order to survive a preemption attack
based on federal copyright law.3' The extra element in state breach of
implied contract claims is the understanding of a promise to pay.39 It is
that element which allows these state claims to remain intact with the
passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.
For example, in Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game
Players,' the court stated that "California law allows for recovery for
the breach of an implied-in-fact contract when the recipient of a
valuable idea accepts the information knowing that compensation is
expected, and subsequently uses the idea without paying for it."'" In
that case, the plaintiff "wrote a book on strategy for winning at the
Scrabble board game. 42 The owner of the Scrabble trademark asked
for a copy of the manuscript, and the plaintiff provided one.43 Later,
that same owner came out with its own book on Scrabble strategy,
and the plaintiff brought suit. ' The court found that the plaintiff's
disclosure was such that "defendants' use of any portion of it was
conditioned on payment. ''4' The point is that disclosure of the idea
may amount to consideration for a promise to pay.46
In Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System,47 the California
Supreme Court held that:
the right of the originator of an idea to recover from one who uses
35. See, e.g., Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1950); Desny v.
Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956).
36. Barrett, supra note 1, at 373.
37. Stan Soocher, Bit Parts, ENTERTAINMENT LAW AND FINANCE, May, 2004, at 8.
38. Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2001).
39. Id.
40. 802 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1986).
41. Id. at 1196.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956).
47. Stanley v. ColumbiaBoard Sys., 221 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1950).
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or infringes it seems to depend upon whether or not the idea was
novel and reduced to concrete form prior to its appropriation by
the defendant, and, where the idea was disclosed by the originator
to the appropriator, whether such disclosure took place under
circumstances indicating that compensation was expected if the
idea was used. 8
Justice Traynor's dissent in that opinion has become accepted in
many jurisdictions, 49 and is therefore noteworthy. He argued that:
[wihen a plaintiff claims the protection of an implied-in-fact
contract for an abstract idea, his idea must have the characteristic
of novelty for which defendant has promised to pay .... General
similarity in non-protectable elements, being irrelevant, cannot
support an inference of copying in... a suit upon a contract.5
Justice Traynor's point is a wise one, because the "non-
protectable elements" he refers to are not ideas, but mere common
knowledge. Only when a person takes the elements of common
knowledge, and puts them together into a unique story, does he have
something that is protectable. This does not change the fact that he is
not entitled to protection for the elements used in the idea, but only
for the idea itself in the event that it is used.
The landmark case of Desny v. Wilder offers a demonstration of
contract theory in action for the protection of ideas. 1 In that case, the
plaintiff telephoned Billy Wilder of Paramount Pictures to discuss an
idea he had for a movie. 2 He described the idea to Wilder's secretary
as the story of the life of Floyd Collins. 3 Plaintiff specifically told the
secretary that he expected to be paid for the reasonable value of the
story in the event that Wilder decided to use it; to which the secretary
said he would "naturally" be paid if Paramount used the story.'
Later, Paramount produced and exhibited a photoplay which "closely
parallels both plaintiff's synopsis and the historical material
concerning the life and death of Floyd Collins."55 Not only that, the
photoplay included a fictional portion which the plaintiff claims was
his addition to the story.56
48. Id. at 75.
49. Barrett, supra note 1, at 373.
50. Stanley, 221 P.2d at 91.
51. Desny, 299 P.2d 257.
52. Id. at 261.
53. ld at 262.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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The issue in Desny was whether or not the plaintiff could recover
on an implied-in-fact contract theory.7 The Supreme Court of
California held that the circumstances would not preclude a finding of
an implied contract to pay.58 The question remaining on remand,
however, would be whether or not the defendants did actually use the
plaintiff's idea. 9 In other words, upon trial the plaintiff would have to
show that his idea was substantially similar to the photoplay created
by Paramount, in order to prevail on this claim.
C. Grosso v. Miramax
In September of 2004, the Ninth Circuit decided Grosso v.
Miramax. 6° In that case, Jeff Grosso claimed that Miramax, a film
company, "stole the ideas and themes of his work when [it] made the
movie Rounders.,,6' He filed an action alleging two separate theories:
violation of copyright and breach of implied contract.62 The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants on both, and
plaintiff Grosso appealed the judgment.63 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary
judgment on the claim of copyright violation, because the movie
"Rounders" was not "substantially similar" to Grosso's screenplay
"The Shell Game."' The court reiterated that the "works did not
have substantially similar genre, mood, and pace, their themes,
settings, and characters were different, their plot and sequences of
events were not parallel, and although both works had poker settings,
the only similarities in dialogue came from the use of common,
unprotectable poker jargon.""
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's
grant of summary judgment on the breach of implied contract claim,
based on Desny v. Wilder.6 The court explained that Jeff Grosso
submitted the idea to Miramax "with the understanding and
expectation, fully and clearly understood by Defendants that
Plaintiffs would be reasonably compensated for its use by
57. Id. at 263.
58. Id. at 263-64.
59. Id. at 273.
60. 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004).
61. Id. at 967.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Defendants."67 Completely overlooking the element of similarity, the
court held that this allegation was enough to state a claim under
Desny.
I. Discussion
A. Grosso deviates from Precedent
The Grosso court ironically cites Desny v. Wilder in allowing the
breach of implied contract claim to go forward, even though Desny's
remand depended on whether or not the defendant actually used
plaintiff's idea in producing its film. Recall that Desny's remand
would depend on a showing of similarity between the two ideas.69 The
court in Grosso explicitly stated that there was no similarity
whatsoever between the two stories, aside from their central theme of
poker.7" It seems clear, then, that Miramax did not use Grosso's idea,
and the so-called implied contract should not be allowed to go
forward.
B. Implications of the Grosso Decision
Film studios, like Miramax, most likely acquire hundreds of ideas
for screenplays each year, and are already hesitant to hear more
because of these obligations imposed by the California courts. The
essential import of the Grosso decision is that by hearing an idea for a
movie about poker, Miramax may no longer make any film about
poker without having to pay someone. Further, even if Miramax is
able to show in court that its film was not similar to Jeff Grosso's
idea, it will have wasted time and resources defending a lawsuit on
the matter. Merely hearing an idea could potentially cancel out an
entire realm of movies for the studio's filmmaking, anything that
deals with the same subject matter. This is a troubling result for
anyone who enjoys the films that companies like Miramax make. The
audience, which represents the public, is eventually harmed.
A decision like this could potentially open the door to lawsuits
against companies like Miramax, a producer that is already hesitant
to hear too many ideas for fear of being sued. Take a hypothetical
screenwriter who, at some point in the past, presented an idea for a
movie about wine tasting to Fox Searchlight Pictures. Fox declined to
67. Id.
68. Id. at 968.
69. See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956).
70. Grosso, 383 F.3d at 965.
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go forward with the idea. A few years later, the writer reads the
Grosso decision, and then sees the movie "Sideways," a "wry,
comedic exploration of the crazy vicissitudes of love and friendship,
of damnable persistence of loneliness and dreams and the enduring
war between Pinot and Cabernet., 7 t This writer may be able to bring
a claim against Fox using Grosso as precedent, even if his or her story
was completely different than that of "Sideways." Fox's movie
focused on the characters, their lives and relationships, and their
struggles with issues like alcoholism and divorce.7 ' Grosso may allow
the writer to bring a breach of implied contract claim against Fox just
because both movies involved wine tasting, and used terms such as
"full-bodied," or "chardonnay." After all, the only similarities that
the Grosso court found between Grosso's idea and Miramax's movie
were the central theme of poker, and use of poker jargon.73 This
would be an inequitable result, as so much went into "Sideways"
unique story. After all, the film won an Oscar for the story it was
based upon.74
The law in California, as it stands after Grosso, leads to other
complications as well. Consider the following theoretical scenario.
Two screen writers come to the producer with ideas for movies about
soccer. Both have different settings, different characters, different
stories, and different themes. One is a comedy, while the other is a
drama. One is about little kids, while the other is about a professional
sports team. In the end, the producer decides not to pursue either
film. Some time later, the producer does make a film about soccer,
but it is completely dissimilar to either idea it received from the
writers. Must the producer then compensate both of them, merely
because the subject matter in all three happened to be the same?
Such a result would be inequitable, because the producer did not
actually use either idea. In addition, many movies have already been
made about the game of soccer.75
C. The Problem of Consistency
Past decisions regarding the issue of implied-in-fact contracts
over idea disclosure have waffled inconsistently between those
71. See http://www2.foxsearchlight.com/sideways/.
72. Id.
73. See Grosso v. Miramax, 383 F.3d at 965 (9th Cir. 2004).
74. The movie won the award for Best Adapted Screenplay in the 2005 Academy
Awards.
75. For example, both Ladybugs and Bend it Like Beckham are movies involving the
sport of soccer.
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allowing and those not allowing compensation." For example, in
Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., the plaintiff
came to the defendant with an idea for a book on Scrabble strategy.'
The defendant then made a book about just that and refused to
compensate the plaintiff for use of his idea. While the crux of the
appeal was whether or not the plaintiff "unconditionally disclosed his
manuscript before informing S & R that he expected compensation
for its use,"79 the claim was allowed only because the district court
found that the defendant had copied the plaintiff's manuscript.'
In contrast to Landsberg, the California Supreme Court found in
Weitzenkorn v. Lesser that similarity was not significant to the
determination.8 In that case, the plaintiff claimed that she had
created an original literary composition called "Tarzan in the Land of
Eternal Youth."' She submitted a copy of the composition to
defendant Lesser, who later made a movie that was patterned after
her composition, copied it and used it. 3 The California Court of
Appeals had dismissed all three counts of the plaintiff's claim. 8 The
California Supreme Court, however, reversed the dismissal as to the
claims under express and implied contract theory.8' The court
explained that "the idea disclosed may be common or even open to
public knowledge, yet such disclosure if protected by contract, is
sufficient consideration for the promise to pay."" Ultimately, even
though the plaintiff's work was dissimilar to that actually produced
she was entitled to recover compensation for her composition.'
Likewise, according to Faris v. Enberg, "even if the plaintiff's
story and the movie Sol Lesser produced were grossly dissimilar, the
court found that plaintiff was entitled to try to prove that defendant
agreed to pay for the use of this commonplace idea." ' In that case,
76. See, e.g., Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 802 F.2d 1193 (9th
Cir. 1986); Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1953); Faris v. Enberg, 158 Cal. Rptr.
704 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
77. Landsberg, 802 F.2d at 1195.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1196.
80. Id.
81. 256 P.2d 947 (1953).
82. Id. at 950.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 959.
86. Id. at 957.
87. Id. at 959.
88. 158 Cal. Rptr. 704, 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
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the plaintiff came up with an idea for a sports quiz show. 9 He
formatted the idea and brought it to the secretary of K.T.L.A.
Studios.9 The next day, the plaintiff was in contact with a producer at
the studio who was interested in his idea." They discussed producing
the quiz show with Enberg (the defendant) as a master of
ceremonies.9 In the end, the studios went ahead with a sport quiz
show which had "certain differences and similarities between the
show and plaintiff's idea., 93 The plaintiff brought suit for implied
contract, but his claim was dismissed by the trial court and the
dismissal was affirmed at the appellate level.94 Nevertheless, the court
pointed out that the fact that the idea was not a novel one was not
determinative or even significant to the inquiry of whether or not the
plaintiff had a claim.95
These cases are difficult to reconcile, each seeming to have come
out differently. If courts had a concrete standard to apply, this
inconsistency could be lessened dramatically, and producers could
have a better idea of what actions would subject them to lawsuits. In
Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, the California Supreme
Court purported to clarify the rule for similarity between two works.
In that case, the plaintiff came up with an idea for a radio program
and recorded it so he could submit it to prospective broadcasting
companies and sponsors.' He submitted the work to the defendants,
who later "produced and presented a radio program.., which
substantially copied and embodied plaintiff's radio program ....98 In
order to determine whether or not the two works were similar, the
court stated that "the common knowledge of the average reader,
observer, spectator or listener is the standard of judgment which must
be used."9 This standard is much too vague to provide a workable
solution to the inconsistency in California's courts regarding idea
protection. In practice, it has not provided the lower courts with any
89. Id. at 707.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 708.
94. Id. at 705.
95. Id. at 708.
96. Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 221 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1950).
97. Id. at 74.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 78.
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sort of direction as to making the determination of whether these
claims should go forward.
Notice and due process requirements make consistency
extremely important in the law. A filmmaker must be able to predict
when he can and cannot make a film without being obligated to
compensate a writer for the idea, or having to defend himself against
a breach of implied contract claim. The current law has no concrete
standard for evaluating these claims, or clearly differentiating them
from those of federal copyright protection. A much clearer standard
than one of vague "similarity" is necessary.
D. Proposal
i. Defining a "Protectable Idea"
Not all "ideas" are deserving of protection. Before laying out a
standard for breach of implied contract in the idea protection context,
the "idea" being protected must be defined. On some level, a
proposal to create a movie about gambling is an "idea." However, it is
not a protectable one. In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,'0° Judge
Learned Hand struggled with the distinction between mere ideas and
protectable expression of them:
Upon any work ... a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the
most general statement of what the [work] is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his
'ideas,' to which, apart from their expression, his property is
never extended.'01
In other words, though the exact line is difficult to define, an idea
is not protectable unless it has some form of embodiment to actually
protect. The writer must take his vague, general idea (poker) and put
it to words. He adds characters, plot, setting, dialogue, themes, and it
becomes something more, it becomes something protectable. The
proper standard in cases involving breach of implied contract claims
in this context must ensure that only an idea reduced to some
concrete form is afforded protection.
100. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
101. Id. at 121.
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ii. Showing of a Common Element
The question of similarity between two works is one of fact, and
should be for a jury to decide. To prevent frivolous claims from
getting to a jury, there must be a definite standard for a plaintiff to
get past summary judgment on his claim of implied in fact contract.
He or she should be required to show the existence of some common
element beyond the mere subject matter of the works. Examples
include common characters, setting, theme, dialogue, plot, or specific
scenes. If both the screenplay and the film involve the same subject,
and one of these further elements is also the same, it becomes more
likely that the studio has taken and used the writer's idea. The writer
should be able to go to trial on his claim and attempt to prove to a
jury that the works are similar. Without that extra commonality,
however, the court should not be required to entertain the claim and
should declare a finding of summary judgment against the plaintiff.
Likewise, the studio should not have to spend time, effort, and funds
defending itself.
This standard will provide for more consistency in cases of
breach of implied contract for use of ideas. A plaintiff will be unable
to get to trial without being able to show that some concrete aspect of
his or her screenplay was specifically used by the producer. There is a
fine line between this sort of claim and one of copyright protection.
Where a jury finds that the works are "substantially similar,"' '° the
writer may be able to sue for copyright infringement under the
Copyright Act. The writer claiming breach of implied contract does
not have as high a bar to overcome. He should not be required to
show the same level of substantial similarity as a claimant of
copyright infringement. Instead, he must show that some of the same
or similar elements in his story were also in the film created by the
studio. In essence, the showing is less than that required for copyright
claims, but more than a showing that the two works simply involved
one common subject.
iii. Focus on Similarity at Trial
Once a plaintiff gets past summary judgment, he must prove to
the jury that his work is similar to the film produced. In order to
recover, a jury should find that the two works have more
commonalities than the mere topic, such that an inference is raised
that the producer would not have come up with the idea for the film
without having heard or read the writer's work first. Many cases also
102. Kay Berry, Inc. v. Taylor Gifts, Inc., 421 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2005).
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refer to "novelty," which has been defined as "original to the
plaintiff."'0 3 In the context of motion pictures, it seems an idea would
be considered "novel" if it has never been done before. In New York,
emphasis is placed on novelty in deciding idea protection cases on
theories of breach of implied contract. There, "[s]pecial protection is
afforded only to truly innovative ideas... Where an idea consists in
essence of nothing more than a variation on a basic theme, novelty
cannot be found to exist. '' °
The inquiry in these cases should focus on similarity as opposed
to novelty for three reasons. First, in theory the two are separate
determinations, but in practice they may be difficult to differentiate.
Second, novelty is a vague term that is not easily applied. It raises the
question of what, specifically, must be novel about the work. On the
one hand, a work would most likely be considered "novel" if it is
about a topic that has never been made into a movie before.
However, as argued above, that topic by itself should not be
protectable. On the other hand, a writer may take a topic that has
been done before, and create a "novel" setting for that topic. It isn't
as clear in the latter case that the idea is the "original to the
plaintiff."'' 5
The third reason that similarity is a better focus than novelty is
that novelty may be extremely difficult to prove. In the context of
film, it is difficult to determine whether an idea is "innovative."' A
work would be novel if a film has never been made before on the
same idea, which would seem to require a comparison of the writer's
work to every other work ever made. Even with Internet resources,
this may be a very trying task.
This is not to say, however, that novelty should be left out of the
inquiry altogether. If, for example, it is clear that the topic of the
screenplay is one about which no film has ever been made, the writer
may be entitled to more protection. This showing of novelty in his
idea would not be enough, by itself, to allow compensation to the
writer. Rather, it would raise a flag to the jury that the filmmaker
more likely got the idea from the writer's work. The writer must still
be able to show that the works are similar, but his required showing
would be less than in the case of topics that have been made into
movies before. In other words, novelty is something the jury should
103. Stevens v. Cont'l Can Co., 308 F.2d 100, 104 (6th Cir. 1962).
104. Jackson, supra note 28, at 60.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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be able to consider, but it is not a good central focus of inquiry. For
one thing, the works must still be similar in order to recover
compensation. Also, to prove that a topic has never been made into a
movie before may be exceedingly difficult.
E. Application to Grosso v. Miramax
Applying the forgoing standard to the Grosso case, it becomes
clear that the lower court was correct in its finding of summary
judgment against the plaintiff.1°7 The case involved two works that had
no common element beyond the fact that both were about the general
subject of poker.1°8 The court did mention the use of similar "poker
jargon"'" in both the screenplay and the film. However, that
similarity does not meet the further common element requirement of
the proposed test. It would be difficult if not impossible for Miramax
to create a film about poker without using terminology of the game.
Further, Jeff Grosso did not come up with such terminology himself.
Therefore, these terms should not be considered "ideas" of Jeff
Grosso, and should not allow him to go forward on his breach of
implied contract claim.
Grosso's movie idea may have been original as expressed, but
the idea to make a movie about poker or gambling is not a new one.
In the past, dozens upon dozens of films have been made with that
subject matter. " ' Thus Miramax is in good company as far as creating
films about these activities, all with unique characters, storylines, and
themes. It does not follow that Jeff Grosso's idea has been used. The
new standard therefore ensures a more just result.
Recall Justice Traynor's statement in Stanley v. Columbia
Broadcasting that general similarity is not enough to allow for
compensation of the writer."1 The idea of poker, by itself, is a non-
protectable element, because it is not a unique phenomenon that
Grosso created. Rather, it is an element of common knowledge that
many have used to create unique accounts of the game.
107. Grosso v. Miramax, 383 F.3d 965, 965 (9th Cir. 2004).
108. Id. at 967.
109. Id.
110. Two websites offer extensive lists of movies made about poker and gambling. The
first is http://www.playwinningpoker.com/poker/movies. The second is
http://www.gocee.com/poker/movies.htm. Examples include The Color of Money,
Maverick, and The Cincinnati Kid.
111. 221 P.2d 73, 91 (Cal. 1950) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
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F. Public Policy Considerations
In International News Service v. Associated Press, Justice
Brandeis made the famous statement that "[t]he general rule of law
is, that the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-became, after voluntary
communicated to others, free as the air to common use.",112 This
statement is made in just about every law review article written on the
topic of idea protection. 3 An idea, without more, cannot be
protected because it is abstract and it lacks the embodiment or
expression for which a writer can actually claim protection. In Grosso,
the plaintiff had put a unique story into concrete form, a form which
Miramax chose not to use. Many have argued that California does not
give adequate protection to writers under this doctrine. For example,
one commentator argues that ideas may not be protected under any
theory at all anymore, because "a plaintiff.., must fight for months
at great expense to survive the pleading stage," and "the defendant
will move to dismiss the claim contending it is preempted by the
Copyright Act of 1976.""' The gist of arguments like this seems to be
that writers are not afforded sufficient protection for their ideas. The
other side of the equation is often overlooked: the interest of the
producers in being able to look at as many scripts as possible to make
the best film. When producers do hear or acquire an idea, they should
not be so easily obligated to compensate idea submitters merely
because they make a movie with the same or similar subject matter.
Forcing payment under circumstances where a film is merely the
same topic as a writer's idea, without more, is very dangerous. It may
lead producers to be hesitant to hear new ideas. The more ideas a
filmmaker hears in turn allows the public to view the best possible
movies.
What makes Hollywood so noteworthy is the ability of
filmmakers to hear as many ideas as possible to make the best film. In
forcing Miramax to compensate Jeff Grosso, not for using his idea,
but merely making a film regarding the same subject matter,
producers will be reluctant to hear stories at all, especially by less
well-known writers. In the end, everyone will be harmed. The
producer clearly suffers, but so do the writers themselves as well as
the public. The writers may be harmed because studios will be less
112. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
113. See, e.g., Michaud & Tulquois, supra note 2, at 79.
114. Kulik, supra note 2, at 2.
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willing to hear new ideas. With regards to the public, avid movie-
goers want companies like Miramax to continue making unique and
entertaining films. Bear in mind the goal of the Framers of the
Constitution, "to promote the progress of science and useful arts." '115
Decisions like Grosso actually tend to hamper the progress of the arts
as opposed to promoting them, by chilling the producers from hearing
ideas. Clearly the writers should be afforded some protection for their
ideas, ideas they no doubt spent much time, effort, and resources in
coming up with. However, protection of these ideas cannot come at
the expense of the filmmaker's ability to hear the best ideas and
create the best films. Writers should rightly be compensated, but only
when a filmmaker makes a movie based on their ideas.
IV. Conclusion
In the past, federal law only provided protection to published
works, a fact that changed with the passage of the Copyright Act of
1976.16 However, it has never offered protection for mere ideas,
which were sometimes protected through state law theories.1 17 The
most common of these theories are in the realms of property law,
confidential relationships, and contracts."8 In the past, cases such as
Desny v. Wilder have seemed to interpret the implied-in-fact contract
theory to require a showing of similarity.119 While this showing should
be essential to the claim, it has thus far been ambiguous and has led
to inconsistent results. The lack of a clear standard has led courts to
allow claims to go forward even when no similarity appears at all, as
the Ninth Circuit decision of Grosso v. Miramax demonstrates.'
20
The Grosso decision demonstrates the trouble with idea
protection law in California, where the doctrines are too generous
and too vague. There are many considerations which make Grosso a
bad decision. First, it does not follow the precedent set by cases such
as Desny v. Wilder, because it allows the breach of implied-in-fact
contract claim for works that deal with the same subject but are
otherwise dissimilar. Second, it has potential negative implications.
Film studios may be obligated to provide compensation in a wide
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
116. Barrett, supra note 1, at 396.
117. Id. at 398.
118. Id.
119. See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257 (Cal. 1956).
120. See Grosso v. Miramax, 383 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004).
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variety of circumstances, without proper notice. They may, as a result,
be more hesitant to hear ideas, which will harm the public.
Courts should require a plaintiff to show that his screenplay and
the film created are not only about the same thing, but also have
some common element that would lead a reasonable person to
believe that something has been copied, at least in part. That element
may be a character, a group of characters, lines or dialogue, setting,
plot, specific scene, or central theme. Only upon this showing should
a plaintiff be allowed to go to trial on the claim. At trial, a jury will
determine whether the works are similar enough to require
compensation. While novelty may be relevant to the determination, it
is not sufficient to a finding for the plaintiff. A showing of substantial
similarity between the two works is not necessary, which
differentiates the state law claim from federal copyright protection.
Rather, the jury must find that more than the mere topic of the works
is the same. This standard will also ensure more consistency between
the cases, as past cases are difficult to reconcile.
Ultimately, the law should reflect the rights of both the writers
and the producers. The purpose of a movie is, after all, to display for
the public's enjoyment. If the rights of both parties are not given
adequate protection in the courts, the public will suffer as a result.
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